You will recall that we identified the role of the context in determining the meaning of indexical references such as here, there or now. If I say to you: “the work must be finished now” and someone else tells you “youths are far more responsible now than ever” and your father tells you “I’m here now” you are able to differentiate between the various indexical now depending on the context in which each occurs.
The last expression for example may be interpreted as a reassurance than mere announcing your father’s presence at that particular time or even a warning. Speech acts show the force that utterances have for counting as actions rather than mere giving of information. In this article we shall examine in fair detail how words or utterances perform actions such as promising, commanding, warning etc.
Table of Contents
Doing things with Words
John Austin (1962) also Searle (1969) recognised that language is a tool for performing actions. Therefore the “meaning” we associate with an utterance is the user’s intention, and not the meaning of words in the utterance. If we study a user’s intention, we are studying what s/he does with words, either in speech or writing. Austin postulates that when an individual makes an utterance, s/he performs some “speech acts” such as requesting, questioning, pronouncing, informing etc. This implies that rather than talk of linguistic forms of the utterance, we talk of the functions of these forms. For example:
|
Form |
Function |
|
(i) May I use your pen for a moment? Request |
Interrogative |
|
(ii) Did you attend the lecture? Question |
Interrogative |
|
(iii) Leave the room! Command |
Imperative |
|
(iv) I lost the opportunity Information |
Declarative |
Forms such as “Did you attend the lecture?” “Are you coming to my party” “Can you play the piano?” used as questions are described as direct speech acts. Now compare direct speech acts with the following forms:
(ii) Can you spare your piano?
The form in (vi) is not likely to be treated as a question just like the form in (i). Rather than being viewed as a question about the person’s ability to spare his piano, you will treat it as a request although it is presented in form of a question. This is described as indirect speech act.
We realise that we indeed do things with words when we talk. We often say:
(iii) “I’m here now” to comfort someone or reassure them
(iv) “I’ve come again” to apologise for troubling someone
(v) “Don’t forget me” to remind someone that he hasn’t done your job or
(vi) “You met me well” to invite someone to eat with you
All the above examples show that there is a difference between the literal meaning of what is said and what acts the utterances actually performed.
Indirect Speech Act
As we said above, indirect speech act is when a statement is used to perform an action such as request, permission, or apology other than its direct implication. A question like “do you have some money there?” from a friend alighting from a taxi certainly means a request for some money. “You packed the car on the road” could mean “go and remove the car” or “the door is open” may be a request (indirectly) asking someone to shut the door.
What do you think of a situation where someone fails to understand another person’s indirect speech act? If someone comes to you and asks you: “please do you know the way to the post office?” If you simply say yes and go away, of course the person will definitely get embarrassed because you have failed to interpret his/her indirect speech of asking you to direct him/her to the post office. S/he may even take it that you understood but deliberately didn’t want to help him/her.
Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts
Take the statement in (x) above again for example. It says: “You met me well.”
(a) First, this statement conveys a proposition that the speaker is met in good condition of health and both the speaker and hearer are well. In this case, the statement as a sentence is conveying something true and meaningful.
(b) If this sentence is taken as an utterance, it has a force, which is counted as an invitation to eat. Used in this way, it doesn’t matter if the sentence is true or false; rather the utterance represents the intention of the speaker to invite.
(c) The utterance will have some effects or consequences, especially what the invitee considers the utterance to mean for him. Normally in the Zambian context, the invitee will consider the utterance not just as an invitation to eat but also a form of a welcome, comradeship and acceptance, even if he doesn’t join in the meal. In most cases the invitee doesn’t eat but the speaker is well disposed to having him at table.
Austin (1962) explains that when an individual makes a sentence with a certain meaning using the grammar, phonology and semantics of the language. S/he performs the locutionary act. Therefore (a) above is locutionary act because it makes a determinate “sense.” The Illocutionary act is the intention of an utterance to constitute either an act of promise, command, invitation, agreement, greeting, pronouncement etc. (b) above is the illocutionary act (i.e. to invite). If the utterance achieves certain response or effect, like embarrassment, fear, confusion, enjoyment, acceptance etc., it is called the Perlocutionary act.Therefore (c) above is the perlocutionary act.
The illocutionary act is where speakers or writers actually “do things with words”. According to Austin, illocutionary act is performed by “performative sentences”, because, by virtue of its structure, a performative sentence has a “conversational force” like the force of pronouncing a man and a woman husband and wife or sentencing a defendant in court.
Searle’s Speech Acts
Searle (1969) gives the condition for performing speech acts. The “felicity conditions” must be met in order to make a promise for instance. The conditions are as follows:
i. the utterance refers to some future act of the speaker
ii. the speaker would not normally be carrying it out
iii. the speaker recognizes he has taken on a responsibility
These “conditions” are to determine when the performance of speech act may be appropriate or inappropriate.
Searle (1976) further gives 5 types of acts that are performed in speaking. They are:
(i) Representative Act – describing events, process, states; also assertions, claims, reports, suggestion etc. A newspaper report such as “the plane crashed at Lisa in Ogun state in the early hours of yesterday” will be considered as performing a representative act.
(ii) Declarative Act– pronouncing, sentencing, christening, e.g. I christen you John.
(iii) Directive Acts– commanding, requesting, pleading, inviting, e.g. Leave this room immediately!
(iv) Expressive Acts– greeting, scolding, condoling, appreciating, congratulating, apologizing, e.g. I wish a merry Christmas
(v) Commissive Acts– betting, challenging, promising, threatening, offering, vowing, warning e.g. I promise to provide you with adequate social amenities.
We can see clearly that these acts coincide with Austin’s illocutionary act – the act that expresses the speaker’s intention.
Cook (1989) argues that the above acts must be performed by someone who has the necessary authority to do so. For instance a declarative act of pronouncing a man and a woman husband and wife must be spoken (not written) by a clergyman, while sentencing a man to imprisonment should be at the end of a court proceeding by a judge.
CONCLUSION
Although Austin’s and Searle’s speech acts have generated lots of reactions and criticism, we may not deny that their contribution has been a significant effort in the explanation of how language works in the context of users and situations. Indirect speech act for instance, shows the various ways speakers communicate their intentions in speech without being too direct or offensive. It also shows creative use of language by interactants to achieve some specific goals. This is captured in illocutionary speech acts.
